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Meanwhile, Apple has grown into a massively profitable mobile hardware company with a passionate user base, while Google has only made minor progress in wringing money out of mobile ads while earning virtually nothing from hardware sales.

Apple's exit from the mobile ad sales business may look like a win for Google, but it really signifies that Apple is ready to stop playing in ads where Google has a home field advantage, and instead begin to leverage its entrenched position in hardware in order to starve Google's core business into irrelevance by targeting the valuable foundation of Internet ads.

Over the last five years, Apple has done really well in hardware. It is one of the only consistently profitable PC or smartphone makers. It has essentially crushed its hardware competitors by starving them of profits while reinvesting is own earnings into vertical integration.

This has created a starvation cycle of making Apple's products better and more attractive, while erasing market potential for rivals. Once-fierce PC competitors like HP have been neutered. Samsung has seen its mobile products collapse without recovery. Apple now claims a massive share of global profits earned in PCs, tablets and smartphones largely because there are no other companies left earning competitive profits. It looks like iAd was intended to do the same thing to Google, but it failed to have a similar impact.

Making superior products and dominating demand are one route to success, but it's not the only one. Another way to overcome more powerful and entrenched rivals is to derail the demand for their products. Changing the rules of the game to emphasize the value of one's own strengths and devalue the core competency of one's competitors is nothing new in the tech industry. For example, in the early s Microsoft cut Apple's Macintosh out of commercial relevance by shifting the value of its Mac Office apps onto a Mac-like platform it branded Windows.

With Windows, users no longer need to pay a premium for Apple's hardware, leaving hardware "open" to various Windows hardware licensees. Microsoft concentrated the perception of value on its own PC software, and left the hardware business that it didn't really care about or understand or see any value in to hardware partners.

PC makers competed for scraps while Microsoft skimmed the cream off the top of the industry for two decades. Apple of the s was slow to realize that the overall market might find greater value in running familiar desktop apps on generic PCs. In particular, Apple underestimated the very basic Windows product Microsoft was offering at a relatively low licensing fee.

That same decade, Netscape and Sun worked to develop the web as a "open" platform, hoping to shift value away from Microsoft's software platform. Microsoft realized belatedly— but soon enough to change course — that if web apps opened up software the way it had opened up hardware, it would be left in the same beleaguered position as Apple. Microsoft responded by working to make Windows more valuable and necessary tying emerging web features to Windows APIs. As a result, Microsoft largely retained control of the PC over the next decade.

In the s, Apple similarly regained some PC hardware share by making Mac hardware more valuable and necessary tying apps such as Final Cut Pro and Garage Band to its platform. On a much smaller scale, Apple won back market share for Macs. At the same time, Google began working to do what Netscape and Sun had failed to do earlier: shift web apps away from Windows by breaking the tie between Microsoft's platform and "valuable and necessary" web services. This "openness" benefitted end users, and opened the door for Apple as well, because open web apps could work as well on Macs as they did on Windows.

Apple's subsequent introduction of iOS as new hardware-based platform again created a valuable app ecosystem tied to Apple's hardware, but "open" to third party development. In response , Google sought to replay Microsoft's strategy: it reintroduced Android as a rival to steal away iOS' app value and plant it on a platform that Google controlled, one that would again be "open" to alternative hardware makers.

Unlike Microsoft's Windows, however, Google's Android didn't directly deliver any significant licensing revenue to Google. Android has been subsidized by Google's core business of search-related PC advertising , which ties monetization of most everything on the web to Google's ads.

While pundits like to marvel about Google's supposed "80 percent share" of mobile hardware sales, the reality is that virtually all of Google's profits come from advertising. That means that if Apple wanted to drain Google of its income, it wouldn't need to take away a significant chunk of Android's hardware sales as it did with Samsung.

It would take away Google's advertising revenue. That would be obviously disastrous for Google, because it has virtually no other sources of income. Apple's iAd appeared to be a way for Apple to muscle away Google's ad platform and tie the value of ads to iOS, much the same way that Microsoft had earlier tied the value of the web to Windows. However, ads aren't a value to end users; they're a tax. Over the past several years, it's become clear that Apple is now seeing that there's more value in not having ads than there is in owning advertising on iOS.

This indicates that going forward, Apple can court more satisfied customers— the people who pay a premium for its high-end hardware— by offering more privacy than from offering more private ads. Faced with direct competition from Android "opening" up mobile hardware, what Apple has needed was a way to offensively "open" up monetization of content, software and services so that it's not tied to Google's ads.

In parallel with the development of iAd, Apple has been on an incessant march to develop premium, desirable hardware that contributes enough profit to fund the development of competitive software and services that deprive Google of ad revenue. In Search , Google's core competency, Apple has invested in Siri and Maps and partnered with Yahoo, Microsoft, Wolfram, DuckDuckGo and other data providers to answer questions and find information independent of Google. Apple's services aren't yet on par with Google in every respect, but each time users check the weather, get sports scores or do research without involving Google, Apple reduces traffic from the most valuable demographic of users to its primary rival.

In the App Store , Apple has shifted users' routine computing and entertainment tasks from web pages to individual native apps. Web apps once promised to rival desktop software, allowing end users to do anything online and "in the cloud. The App Store has created a curated market for apps that gives Apple a share in the success of developers, and has introduced In App Purchases as a route to recurring revenue, a sort of on-demand subscription model.

Third parties including Microsoft and Adobe have also brought a subscription model to software apps, and content providers like Netflix and Hulu have done the same for media. Google also has an Android app store. Who knows why? It should be pushing web or native thin client apps that focus the user on the web, where it already has ads. Instead, it blindly copied Apple before realizing that it knows little about native platforms or how to manage them. It then started over with Chrome OS, a browser running on Linux.

This made a lot more sense for a web-oriented company. Unfortunately for Google, Chrome hasn't been able to win users back from an app-centric model. Google is now working out how to move forward , but its strategy is rather limited by the broad distribution of Android and its iOS-like app focus. In a world of apps, users go directly to an app to begin looking for things. In the desktop world, users often start with a web page opened to Google, and begin searches that present results right next to sponsored ads.

This "paid search placement" advertising has been very effective for Google, because it puts ads right in the context of the users' needs. Ad banners in an app are not effective at all; they are a distraction. They pay virtually nothing because do little of value for advertisers and users hate them. A world centered on apps is terrible for Google, but it's great for Apple. Microsoft is working to undermine that by making iOS apps easier to port to Windows mobile devices, but the tiny installed base of Windows outside of conventional PCs makes that a real uphill challenge.

Next to apps, Apple Music has introduced a subscription model for unlimited, on demand music and videos.

Part of the Apple Music package is Beats 1 radio, a commercial free Internet radio broadcast that Apple essentially subsidizes to draw attention to Apple Music.

Apple also sponsors events like the Apple Music Festival and the recent Taylor Swift tour video, paid to produce new music videos and runs its Connect service, an ad-free social media feed for artists. This direction of ad-free content suggests the potential for more new and original material paid for by subscriptions or subsidized by Apple itself. Click again to start watching. App Store Connect. Asked by Macho Man Randy Savage. Copy to clipboard Share this post. Copied to Clipboard.

Add a Comment. Hi I also haven't received any revenue from IAds for month of November. Posted by bobek. Thanks for responding. I sent them a message yesterday about this. Posted by Macho Man Randy Savage. Did anyone get iAd earnings for November? Did you get any response from Apple iAd? Posted by hiromika. No I still haven't gotten a response from Apple. At least I'm not the only person affected. Posted by antriver. I e-mailed a screenshot of the revenue earned for November in iAd dashboard.

Last e-mail I got they said they forwarded the issue to appropriate team. Yeah, I'm hoping to hear something soon on this. Posted by Jozsef Punk.

Same issue here Posted by BrianAkaBear. In short, to develop an application that can grow, make money and stay ahead of the game, application developers need to do one or all of the following:.

Mobile ads are here to stay. I understand some people being unhappy with such a major company pushing a big platform, but I feel iAds will do a great job. Apple, the kings of clean user experiences, have absolutely no desire to make it possible for junky ads to clutter up applications.

The assumption seems to be that the ads will diminish or detract from the user experience in significant ways. However, in the end it will likely be the exact opposite, but we will see as people vote with their downloads. Was this article helpful? We hope so! If it was, you might want to consider purchasing your next set of shipping supplies or stamps from Amazon.



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